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In this paper we discuss selected aspects of Poland￿s road to the euro zone. Our attention focuses 
on the proper design of macroeconomic policy during the accession period. We address the issue 
of entering ERM II, with special attention to the choice of central parity, fluctuation bands, 
possible revaluation of the parity and sharing the burden of interventions with the ECB. 
 
Further we concentrate on the issue of a simultaneous fulfilment of all convergence criteria. We 
point at the central role of fiscal austerity in providing a save framework for fulfilling the 
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   2 
Introduction 
 
After the enlargement of the European Union, the preparation of the accession countries to join 
the Eurosystem gains importance and momentum. The National Bank of Poland (NBP) is 
strongly willing to join the euro area as soon as possible and, with respect to its competence, feels 
responsible for the best preparation of Poland for this event.  
 
To join the single currency area, Poland has to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria. First, 
this requires the central bank to lower inflation in a credible way. Second, the credibility of low 
inflation must be confirmed by market expectations in form of low long-term interest rates. 
Third, this requires the government to make an effort to lower the general government deficit and 
prevent public debt from increasing excessively. Finally, this requires the government and the 
NBP to prepare and introduce a successful program of participation in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II). 
 
In this paper we concentrate on major issues related to the necessity of fulfilling simultaneously 
all convergence criteria. Special emphasis is placed on the coordination problem between 
monetary and fiscal policies. We are trying to elaborate on the problem of optimal timing 
between monetary and fiscal policy on the way to the euro. We also highlight the main 
ambiguities, inconsistencies and vagueness of the design of the accession pattern. Some possible 
solutions are suggested. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 1 describes briefly the Polish experience with 
the strategy of direct inflation targeting (DIT) in the period 1999-2004. Part 2 discusses the issues 
related to entering ERM II. Special interest will be placed on choosing the right parity and the 
width of fluctuation bands as well as the question of sharing the burden of foreign exchange 
interventions with the European Central Bank (ECB). Part 3 will be devoted to describing our 
view on how to design the accession process. In particular we will address the issue of necessary 
appreciation of the Polish currency during the participation in ERM II, discuss problems related 
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and consider the possibility of revaluing the central parity during   3 
the participation. Here the problem of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy will be 
addressed. Part 4 concludes. 
 
1  Towards ERM II 
 
 
In 1998, the newly established Monetary Policy Council (MPC) decided to introduce the regime 
of direct inflation targeting (DIT). The ￿Medium-Term Strategy of Monetary Policy 1999-2003￿ 
set a goal of below 4% for the inflation rate in 2003 (MPC 1998), and announced floating the 
zloty exchange rate in the future. According to the Strategy, the departure from the crawling peg 
regime was supposed to let market forces bring the market rate closer to its equilibrium level, 
before the Polish currency would enter ERM II.  
 
The floating found place in April 2000, however actually the deep regime changes occurred 
already in 1998, when the NBP stopped FX interventions, and in 1999, when it ceased so called 
transactional fixing operations with the banking sector that enabled the commercial banks to 
close their open foreign exchange positions with the central bank at the end of a day (Osiński 
1999). Soon after the floating, in July 2000, the process of strong appreciation, both in real and 
nominal terms started (Fig. 1). However, as it can be seen, finally the real effective exchange rate 
returned to its long run appreciation path of about 4% per annum. Thus, although increased 
volatility of the series can be clearly observed, the evidence speaks strongly against the often-
repeated view, that floating the exchange rate would dramatically speed up the real appreciation 
trend.  
 
It can be also said with much certainty that the floating exchange rate protected Poland against 
turbulences that in the recent years took place in emerging markets around the world. The 
reactions in the Polish FX market were tempered even in the event of the Argentinean crisis, or 
the huge external imbalance on the Polish current account which exceeded 8% of GDP in Q1 
2000 (Fig. 2). 
   4 
From the perspective of four years it can be said unambiguously that the floating exchange rate 
was a good choice for the Polish economy
2. Not only did it provide the full autonomy of 
antiinflationary monetary policy (constrained by the ￿impossible trinity problem￿), but also 
immunized the economy against external shocks that could have otherwise caused a currency 
crisis
3. Hence, in our view, Poland should stick to the floating exchange regime in the nearest 
future, until the ERM II entry. 
 
Figure 1: Zloty real effective exchange rate (CPI deflated) and H-P trend 1992-2003 
 
Source: own calculations based on NBP data 
 
 
                                                           
2 This view is, however not uncontroversial. For a critical assessment see for instance Bofinger (2003). 
3 The problem of internal inconsistency faced by the monetary policy in Poland in 1995-1997 is discussed in greater 
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a) Basket consists of 50% USD and 50% EUR. 
Source: own calculations based on NBP data 
 
2  ERM II - getting inside 
 
As it has previously been noted, direct inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate seems to 
be a well designed monetary policy regime for a country like Poland. Thus, from our point of 
view, the quasi-fixed exchange rate system we have to go through in order to fulfill the 
Maastricht criteria cannot be considered as a very tempting one. Consequently, it seems to be a 
reasonable solution to proceed in a way that will guarantee as short as possible participation in 
ERM II. In view of the accession procedure this means not much longer than two years of   6 
participation, provided that at the moment of evaluation Poland will fulfill the remaining 
convergence criteria.  
 
2.1  Fulfilling the convergence criteria 
 
Hence, from our point of view, entering the ERM II will make sense only, if the remaining 
Maastricht criteria are to be met within 2 years. Below we present a brief discussion of all the 
criteria: 
i)  inflation: in 2003 CPI inflation stabilized at a low level of 0.8%. The (Harmonized Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) for Poland shows only minor difference against the CPI, and 
its average over the last 12 month stabilized in December 2003 at 0.7% so that Poland 
fulfils the Maastricht inflation criterion (Fig. 3). Since January 2004 the NBP￿s inflation 
target has been stabilizing the CPI growth rate at 2.5% with a tolerance band of +/- 1 p.p. 
(MPC 2003). If we consider that the reference value can be expected to fluctuate around 
2% over the long run, inflation will probably require a slight reduction before the 
evaluation. This however, should not be a major issue (NBP 2004). 
 










































































































Average of three best EU performers
 
Source: NBP calculations based on Eurostat and Central Statistical Office data    7 
ii)  interest rates: long term interest rates have come down sharply in the period 2000-2003, 
so that Poland fulfils the interest rate criterion as well (Fig. 4). One can be pretty sure that, 
even if temporary reversal in the convergence process pushes the rates again above the 
reference value, at the latest after entering ERM II, interest rates will further converge to 
the levels observed in the euro area, as it happened in Greece in 1999 - 2000, provided 
that the parity would be credible (Borowski, Woreta 2002). 
 
iii)  public debt: in 2002 public debt attained 41.8 % of GDP (Tab. 1). Although the ratio has 
been rising and is projected to grow further over the recent future, we do not see a major 
threat that the explosion of debt over the 60% reference value could jeopardize Poland￿s 
accession to the euro area. This is because of the constitutional limit, which obliges the 
government to provide a budget in surplus if the debt (increased with anticipated guaranty 
and surety payments) to GDP ratio exceeds 60%.  
 










































































































Average of three EU countries (w ith the low est HICP) 
 
Source: NBP calculations based on Eurostat and Bloomberg data 
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•  Acc. to the ESA 95, the general government sector debt does not include matured liabilities of budget units 
that are treated as accrual basis expenditures but they constitute an element of the debt according to the 
Polish methodology.  
•  The ESA 95 methodology treats the second pillar pension funds (OFE) as part of the public sector. 
Consequently treasury securities held by OFE are netted out of general government debt. In 2003 this 
explained approximately 5 p.p. of the difference between the methodologies presented above. 
Source: PEP (2003) 
 
iv)  general goverment deficit: the general government deficit in 2003 exceeded 4% of GDP 
(according to ESA 95), which is well above the Maastricht benchmark. Over the last year 
the government projections became less and less favourable and point currently at staying 
above 3% until 2006 (Tab. 2). This means that the deficit can become the major obstacle 
to the fulfillment of convergence criteria.  
 





Having said this, it must noted that there are certain institutional problems with the design of the 
Maastricht criteria which can complicate the convergence verification process soon. The Treaty 
states that the reference values both for the inflation and interest rate criterion are calculated on 
the basis of three best EU (not euro zone!) performers. Paradoxically this may soon (already in 
May 2004) be 3 new member states and thus non euro-area participating countries. In December 
2003 from among the future EU-25 it was Lithuania, Czech Republic and Poland who had the 
lowest inflation rates (respectively -1.1%, -0.1% and 0.7%). Assuming that deflation is 
inconsistent with price stability, the wording of the Treaty may still be problematic as the 
2002 2003  2004  2005  2006  Specification 
Execution Forecast 
Public debt increased with 
anticipated guaranty and surety 
payments 
47.4 50.8  54.5  57.1  57.2 
General government debt (ESA￿95)
 * 41.8  44.3  46.9  49.2  49.1 
 
2002  2003 2004 2005 2006   
Execution Forecast 
Balance  (ESA￿95)  -3.8  -4.1 -5.0 -4.0 -3.4 
Source: PEP (2003)   9 
countries with deflation will after some time (once the positive inflation rate reappears) enter the 
group of the three best EU performers in terms of price stability. All this would lead to a drop in 
the reference value followed by its higher volatility (Chmielewski, Rozkrut 2004) and thus 
complicate the pursuit of the macroeconomic policy aimed at compliance with convergence 
criteria.  
 
A similar problem applies to the interest rate criterion. Since the reference countries are the same 
as above, it might soon be the case that three new member states will set the interest rate criterion 
as well. However, as opposed to the previous case, in this case an increase in the reference value 
might be expected (again accompanied by its higher volatility), since long-term yields are higher 
in most new member states that in the euro area. 
 
Summing up, although Poland already fulfils three convergence criteria, the euro-zone accession 
process may be all but fast and simple. First, it does not seem very likely that the government 
could lower the public sector deficit below 3% before 2007. Second, even though the inflation 
criterion is fulfilled at the moment, given the central bank target of 2.5% CPI inflation over the 
medium run it is possible that at some point in the future Poland will again find itself above the 
reference value. What worsens the matter is the ambiguity about the future level of the reference 
value resulting from its formulation in the Treaty. Last but not least, the two-year participation 
period in ERM II, necessary to fulfil the exchange rate criterion, lies still ahead.  
 
In what follows, we discuss the major issues resulting from the above-presented trinity of targets. 
In the remainder of this section we concentrate on issues related to entering ERM II. In section 3 
we concentrate on combining exchange rate, interest rate and fiscal policy before and during 
ERM II participation to reach the goal of necessary convergence. 
 
2.2  Choosing the central parity 
 
Choosing the central parity for ERM II will be a difficult issue, not only because of supposedly 
hard negotiations with the ECB, but also due to the analytical burden. As there are various ways 
to calculate the equilibrium rate of exchange, there is very scarce knowledge, which is the best   10 
one, and they will probably return different results (ECB 2002 b). The most frequently used 
concepts of equilibrium exchange rate are the corrected Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), one 
known as the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) approach and one based on the 
Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) methodology.  
 
The approach based on PPP is a two step algorithm (Brook, Hargreaves 2001; Baude, Coudert, 
Couarde 2002). In the first step the exchange rate that would result from applying directly the 
concept of absolute purchasing power parity is being calculated. Obviously the rates differ 
substantially from the market rates (for instance according to this estimate, the zloty equilibrium 
exchange rate in 2000 should have been 1.98 PLN/USD against 4.34 PLN/USD average market 
rate). This estimate must be corrected by the difference in GDP per capita between countries, 
which is the second step of the analysis.  
 
In order to calculate the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate  (Wiliamson 1985) two 
estimates are necessary: the exchange rate elasticities of exports and imports and the sustainable 
current account position. Further, one has to calculate the equilibrium exchange rate that would 
have equalized the current account balance with medium term financing possibilities in each 
period of time at the same time providing internal equilibrium (i.e. zero output gap).  
 
The Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate concept (Alberola et al. 1999; Habereier, Mesquita 
1999; Brook, Hargreaves 2001) is based on the estimation of a long run relationship between the 
real exchange rate and various macroeconomic variables such as productivity, terms of trade and 
the central budget balance that explain the behaviour of the equilibrium exchange rate over the 
longer horizon.  
 
As regards the choice of the central parity in the ERM II, following conclusions may be drawn.  
 
First, empirical research produces ￿ not surprisingly ￿ a fairly wide range of estimates of the 
equilibrium exchange rate for Poland (Borowski et al. 2004). For instance, in the first quarter of 
2002 the zloty exchange rate misalignment ranged from +2,6% (overvaluation, BEER) to +20% 
(overvaluation, PPP). As a corollary, despite the well established frameworks for modelling   11 
equilibrium exchange rate, the ultimate decision on setting the central parity will have to be to 
some extent judgemental.  
 
Second, it is the FEER concept that explicitly addresses the issue of attaining both external and 
internal equilibria thus accounting for the individual characteristics of the economy (on the 
contrary to the panel-based techniques). While setting the central parity, the estimates generated 
by the FEER approach should therefore deserve particular attention among various concepts of 
the equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
Third, large uncertainty surrounding the empirical findings suggests that the probability of setting 
the parity at the wrong level ￿ if driven exclusively by model-based estimates ￿ is relatively high. 
The strong case can therefore be made for factoring in the market exchange rate developments 
during a certain reference period. This conclusion is valid as long as exchange rate fluctuations 
are driven mainly by fundamentals, i.e. they are not triggered by short-term factors such as 
changes in the risk premium. In other words, the market exchange rate may be used as a 
benchmark for setting the central parity in ERM II provided that the entry to the system is 
preceded by a sufficiently long period of relatively high exchange rate stability.  
 
2.3  Choosing the fluctuation bands 
 
The second important decision regarding Poland￿s entry into ERM II is the choice of fluctuation 
bands. The European Council decided in its 1997 resolution that one should interpret ￿normal 
fluctuation bands￿ referred to in the Treaty (Art. 121) as +/- 15% around the central parity. 
However the institutions responsible for preparation of convergence reports are not clear, how 
they interpret the Treaty provisions. According to the recent Convergence Report on Sweden 
(European Commission 2002), one of the conditions to be respected in fulfilling the exchange 
rate criterion is as follows: 
 
„Exchange rate to have been maintained within a fluctuation band of ±2.25% around the 
currency's central parity against the euro in the context of the ERM II. However, the 
extent to which a breach of the ±2.25% fluctuation band would correspond to severe 
tensions would take account of a range of relevant considerations. A distinction is to be   12 
made between exchange rate movements above the 2.25% upper margin and movements 
below the 2.25% lower margin.” 
 
The ECB is even more enigmatic about its application of the Treaty provisions. In the latest 
Convergence Report (ECB 2002) the following interpretation is provided: 
 
„... in the assessment of exchange rate developments the emphasis is placed on exchange 
rates being close to the ERM II central rates. [...] the issue of “severe tensions” is 
generally addressed by examining the degree of deviation of exchange rates from the 
ERM II central rates against the euro, by using such indicators as short-term interest rate 
differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and their evolution, and by considering the role 
played by foreign exchange interventions.” 
 
Thus, although the focus is on the narrow bands, in both cases it is not clear what fluctuations 
will be regarded as a breach of the bands. Moreover, in both cases the application is provided 
with regard to the current evaluation, without mentioning the procedure that would be applied in 
the future. Relying on previous experience with Greece, one can only expect that (at least when 
the wide corridor is adopted) both the Commission and the ECB will accept appreciation above 
the 2.25% margin.  
 
It need not be explained thoroughly that such a situation is very uncomfortable for the future EU 
members, Poland included. As noted earlier, we are not convinced, whether a quasi-fixed 
exchange rate arrangement is the proper one for a country like Poland as it can be less sustainable 
than a float. However, the rules have been set and we are strongly willing to follow them and 
fulfill all the convergence criteria as described in the Treaty. Nevertheless, it would be desirable 
to have a clear description of how the Treaty will be applied.  Thus, instead of a vague 
description, how the Treaty provisions have been interpreted, we would rather know, how they 
will be applied during the next evaluation. 
 
Nevertheless, some basic conclusions can be drawn. First, each depreciation of the exchange rate 
below the +/- 2.25 margin can be regarded as potentially incompatible with the convergence   13 
process and thus, has to be avoided. On the other hand a long-term trend for real appreciation of 
the zloty should be expected (due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and other factors described in 
more detail in part 4.2). As a corollary, in order to maintain inflation below the reference value 
(i.e. likely below the current inflation target) the currency must be allowed to appreciate  in 
nominal terms, possibly above the 2.25% benchmark over the two year horizon. Taking these 
issues into account, the most reasonable solution seems to be adopting the wide +/- 15% 
fluctuations margin and preventing ￿ by means of foreign exchange interventions or interest rate 
changes - the nominal exchange rate from depreciating below the -2.25% margin. 
 
This solution, though the most reasonable one from the macroeconomic point of view, has one 
strong disadvantage - it requires intramarginal interventions. As opposed to interventions at the 
margins, these do not find unlimited financial support from the ECB provided within the 
framework of Very Short-Term Financing Facility (VSTF). The ceiling for these loans is being 
set within a bilateral agreement between the ECB and the non euro-area member states￿ central 
banks and has been recently only symbolical as compared with the amount of foreign exchange 
reserves and average daily turnover in the foreign exchange market (Tab. 3) 
 
Table 3: VSTF limits, foreign exchange reserves and daily foreign exchange turnover in selected 
EU countries (EUR mn) 
Country  VSTF limit  Foreign exchange reserves 
(January 2004) 
Foreign exchange turnover 
(April 2001) 
Denmark 520  30,068  26,000 
Greece 300  4,052  6,000 
Sweeden 990  18,275  24,000 
UK 3,480  36,381  504,000 
Source: ECB (1998), BIS (2002), New Cronos. 
 
As national central banks ought to make ￿appropriate use￿ of their own reserves, before they use 
the ECB facility, it seems highly unlikely that Poland would really ever need the ECB money. 
Even using a small part (say 25%) of our foreign reserves (USD 34 bn at the end of 2003) to 
defend the exchange rate, should be considered a useless and costly struggle against the markets   14 
and would be probably classified as ￿severe tensions￿. Hence, the support of the ECB is in fact 
needed to strengthen the stance of the NBP versus the markets. This can be achieved by setting a 
high ceiling VSTF drawings, a ceiling that would probably never be used. After all, a currency 
crisis is in nobody￿s interest, since it always affects one￿s trading partners as well. 
 
3  Coordination of interest rate, fiscal and exchange rate policies  
 
 
In the previous section it has been stated that Poland should enter ERM II with the central parity 
set at a level consistent with the long-term equilibrium exchange rate and with wide fluctuations 
margins. Now it is time to consider the interaction of macroeconomic policies during the 
accession process. As already mentioned, the major issue will be a simultaneous fulfilment of the 
exchange rate, inflation and general government deficit criteria. To achieve this goal, 
policymakers will have to optimally design interest rate, exchange rate and fiscal policies. Below 
we present some considerations behind this relatively complicated control game. For reasons of 
transparency these are grouped by criterion. 
 
3.1 Exchange  rate  criterion 
 
We see two interesting points with respect to the fulfilment of the exchange rate criterion. First, it 
is worth considering, how the presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect interferes with the 
stability of the exchange rate. Second, we would like to describe the major determinants of a 
relatively safe participation in ERM II. 
 
It must be stated clearly that the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Poland is not 
overwhelming. According to various studies the inflation differential between Poland and the EU 
should not be bigger than 3% per annum. Estimates done at the National Bank of Poland show 
that, according to various estimation methods, the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
probably lies between 1 and 2% (Chmielewski 2003). One of the estimation techniques is 
presented in Box 1. 
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One should therefore expect that once inflation rates between Poland and the euro area equalize 
in the convergence process, the effect will come out as nominal currency appreciation of 1-2% 
per year. However, this implies the full and fast pass through from the nominal exchange rate to 
prices of tradable goods which ￿ given nominal rigidities ￿ is never the case. Further, given the 
recent experience, one can expect that the real appreciation might be higher than the estimates of 
B-S. In fact, over the last 10 years the zloty appreciated in real terms (CPI deflated) on average 
by 4% per year. Hence 2-4%, accumulated over the two year participation period, should be 
considered as the lower bound of the equilibrium exchange rate appreciation resulting from the 
catching-up process. As an equilibrium phenomenon, this process should not be prevented and a 
revaluation of the central parity of an appropriate magnitude should be carried out by the end of 
ERM II participation. 
 
The second interesting issue related to the exchange rate target is a relatively safe participation in 
ERM II. Several points of good practice can be mentioned here.  
 
First and foremost, sound public finances are a prerequisite for decreasing the risk of turbulences 
in the financial markets. Too high public sector deficits and related current account deficits have 
triggered several currency crises over the last decade around the world. Poland should not incur 
this risk. Second, the NBP should not allow, for whatever reason, for too much exchange rate 
appreciation above the parity as this may ￿ once reduced exchange rate risk and possible doubts 
about the sustainability of this process are factored in ￿ trigger speculative attacks and a sudden 
exchange rate depreciation. Such an abrupt trend reversal could be interpreted by the ECB and 
the European Commission as ￿severe tensions￿ even in case of not surpassing the -2.25% 
benchmark. Moreover, a sharp depreciation, if occurring too early, could give an inflationary 
impulse jeopardizing the fulfilment of the inflation criterion. Last but not least, firm support of 
the ECB is necessary to convince the markets that the NBP will not stay alone intervening in 
favour of the zloty if it threatens to depreciate below the 2.25% margin. This point is strongly 
related to the question of VSTF limits, discussed in section 2. 
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Box 1: Estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Poland 
 
Over the recent years many authors have presented estimates of the B-S impact on inflation in 
Poland. Among others Egert (2002) and Egert et al. (2002) estimate the B-S component of CPI 
inflation at approximately 1-2%. Halpern and Wyplosz calculated the effect within a panel of 
transition countries and assessed the B-S magnitude at 3% across the region with relatively minor 
country specific effects.  
 
At the NBP a method similar to Canzoneri et al. (1999) has been adopted (Chmielewski 2002). 
The basic model consists of 2 standard equations: 
(1) p=αpT +(1-α)pN 
(2) pN-pT= β(aT-aN) 
which imply: 
(3) p=pT +(1-α)β(aT-aN) 
 
Where p is the log CPI price level, pN is the log of service prices, pT the log of manufacturing 
prices, aN the log of labour productivity in manufacturing industry and aT the log of labour 
productivity in services. 
 
The (1-α) coefficient, being the share of services in CPI, has been calibrated at 0.3, β has been 
estimated from equation (2) by cointegration techniques at 1.2-1.5. The productivity growth rates 
have been calculated as 8.2% per annum in manufacturing and 5% in the service sector. 
 
Accordingly, the component (1-α)β(aT-aN) of equation (3), representing the influence of B-S on 
inflation was estimated in the range 1.2-1.7% per annum. 
 
3.2 Inflation  criterion 
 
According to the ￿Monetary Policy Strategy Beyond 2003￿ (MPC 2003) Poland will enter 2004 
with an inflation target of 2.5% (+/- 1 p.p.). In what follows we assume that at the point Poland 
decides to enter ERM II inflation will be in the middle of the target range. Since it can be   17 
assumed that the reference value for inflation may lie around 2% (NBP 2004), a lowering of the 
inflation rate by approximately 1 p.p. during the first year of ERM II participation and keeping it 
at the lower level during the second year will be necessary to safely fulfil the criterion. The 
reason is that inflation performance during the second year will be taken into consideration when 
verifying compliance with convergence criteria.  
 
The reduction in inflation could be achieved in three ways, by raising interest rates (which de 
facto means a continuation of DIT in ERM II), by letting the exchange rate appreciate or by using 
a fiscal tightening. Below we consider the benefits and drawbacks of these solutions. We start by 
showing the reaction functions of inflation to the aforementioned policies. 
 
Figure 5: Inflation response to a permanent lowering of the general government deficit by 1 per 
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Source: simulations in the ECMOD model 
 






























Source: simulations in the ECMOD model 
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Let us start with the exchange rate. From the point of view of the reaction function it seems 
tempting to use this tool for lowering inflation. However, in our view, two arguments speak 
clearly against this choice. First, it has already been mentioned that because of safety reasons we 
would like lo avoid going with the exchange rate to far from the parity. Lowering inflation by 1.5 
p.p would, however require about 8% nominal exchange rate appreciation. The second reason for 
not relying on the exchange rate is related to the risk that once in ERM II, there may be not 
enough pressure for currency appreciation. Given the current spread of around 150-200 b.p. on 
long term bonds, and taking into account that around 50 b.p. may result from country risk that 
will not disappear after adopting the euro, the field for convergence play seems relatively limited. 
Taking this into consideration we are likely to reject the appreciation option from our policy 
design. The only appreciation of the nominal exchange rate we accept is the one resulting from 
productivity differentials described in the previous section.  
 
Analyzing the role of interest rate policy in reducing inflation we must start with a remark that 
this kind of relationship is always subject to long (Figure 7) and variable lags
4. This cannot be 
considered as an argument against interest rate policy per se, since many central banks 
successfully implement direct inflation targeting strategies. However, it must be noted that once 
on the way to ERM II and later within the system, the efficiency of this strategy may diminish in 
a dramatic and unpredictable way. The main reason is related to the fact that monetary policy is 
transmitted not only through short-term rates, controlled by the central bank, but also by medium 
and long-term rates determined in financial markets. There is no simple mechanism that 
translates short-term into long-term rate changes, however under normal conditions they often 
move in the same direction. However, once the euro-area accession date becomes known, 
medium- and long-term rates will enter into the last phase of convergence and one can be pretty 
sure that their relationship to short-term rates will vanish. This can potentially weaken the 
efficiency of interest rate policy on the eve of the euro adoption.  
 
The last policy tool to be analyzed in this context is fiscal policy. Given the presented response 
function of inflation to a fiscal shock (Figure 6) one can argue that a fiscal tightening could give 
                                                           
4 This is also reflected by the high variability of the natural rate of interest (Brzoza-Brzezina 2003, 2004)   20 
support to monetary policy in reducing inflation. This option is especially tempting, since fiscal 
policy will have to be tightened anyway in order to fulfil the fiscal convergence criterion.  
 
3.3 Fiscal  criterion 
 
It is out of the scope of this paper to analyze thoroughly what exactly should be done to reduce 
the public deficit and fulfil the criterion. Instead we will concentrate on the interdependencies 
between the necessary fiscal tightening and other criteria. As it has already been stated, fiscal 
policy could be useful in both reducing the inflation pressure and increasing the credibility of 
macroeconomic policy thus adding to the probability of fulfilling the exchange rate criterion. 
Now it is time to consider the question when exactly the fiscal tightening should be applied to 
give assistance to the fulfilment of all three criteria.  
 
We analyze 3 possible moments of the fiscal tightening (Figure 8). This can be done either very 
early, much before ERM II accession, on the eve of ERM II accession or already in ERM II. Let 
us start the analysis from the end.  
 
If fiscal austerity is applied only in ERM II, the only goal it can achieve is the fulfilment of the 
public deficit criterion. It will not, however add to the credibility of overall macroeconomic 
policy and, thus not support the sustainability of the exchange rate regime. Neither will it, given 
the lag visible in figure 6, help in fulfilling the inflation criterion. The reaction will obviously 
come too late.  
 
Now, let us analyze the possibility of an early tightening. This would obviously give support to 
both the public deficit criterion and to the credibility problem. However, one problem would 
remain, since in this case the support to disinflation policy would come too early. The 
disinflationary impact of the tightening would die out before the criterion would be evaluated. 
 
Thus, one can suppose that somewhere in the middle there is a point of optimal timing. Given all 
the constraints it should be probably placed shortly before ERM II accession. A fiscal tightening 
on the eve of ERM II could help increase credibility of exchange rate policy, bring about   21 
fulfilment of the deficit criterion and bring the necessary disinflationary impact at the right 
moment, somewhere in the middle of ERM II participation.  
 
Figure 8: Optimal timing of the fiscal tightening 
 
 
Summing up, a fiscal tightening done at the right moment could help solving the major dilemmas 
of policymakers resulting from the process of nominal convergence. It has been argued that the 
credibility and hence, viability of the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime can be substantially 
increased by transparent and stability-oriented fiscal policy. Given the recent unpleasant 
experience of many countries with fixed exchange rates, Poland should seek mechanisms that 
would foster credibility. As a corollary, support from the fiscal side seems critical. We also 
argued that the pursuit of monetary policy, if left with the burden of decreasing inflation shortly 
before accession to the euro area, can be complicated by significant uncertainty surrounding the 
monetary transmission process in a period of strong interest rate convergence. Again, a well-
timed fiscal support could be of significant value.  
 
The above-described problem is an example of a game, where the cooperative solution is clearly 
superior to non-cooperation. Having said this, we must finish with the unpleasant digression that 
the record of policy coordination between the central bank and the government in Poland and 
other countries shows that the strategy of tight cooperation is likely to remain just nice theory. 









In this paper we addressed some of the issues resulting from Poland￿s will to join the euro area. 
Our attention focussed on topics related to the entry into the European system of fixed exchange 
rates ERM II.  
 
The first important choice is related to fixing the central parity. It may be here concluded that ￿ 
given the variety of empirical estimates - the ultimate decision on setting the central parity will 
have to be to some extent judgemental. To minimize the risks arising from exchange rate 
misalignment, the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate should be used as a leading concept 
for deriving the equilibrium exchange rate. Further, developments in the market exchange rate as 
a potential benchmark should also be factored in, provided that the reference period used is 
characterised by relatively high exchange rate stability.  
 
As regards the choice of the fluctuation bands, it is highly possible that some appreciation of the 
zloty will take place during the ERM II participation period. This is related above all to the 
presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Hence, we see the NBP choosing the wide +/- 15% 
band to allow for necessary upward movement of the currency. However, as negative deviations 
from the central parity by more than 2.25% may be regarded as a breach of the Treaty provisions, 
the NBP should prevent the nominal exchange rate from depreciating below this margin. The 
effectiveness of this policy would be enhanced if the potential support provided by the ECB 
within the framework of Very Short-Term Financing Facility turned out to be substantial. 
 
The possible exchange rate trend above the central parity will have to be somehow corrected 
within ERM II. We conclude that at the moment it is difficult to asses, whether this target will be 
achieved via a revaluation of the parity or by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate towards 
parity in the final stage of ERM II. From the economic point of view it seems more reasonable to 
revalue the parity than to let the exchange rate depreciate towards parity in the final stage of 
ERM II, though such a decision may be very hard from the political point of view.  
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Finally, we considered selected problems related to the accession process. These can be divided 
into two groups. Some stem from the institutional design of the process of adopting the euro. 
Others are more related to macroeconomics. 
 
In our view, the major institutional obstacles to smooth transition into the euro-area consist of 
unclear interpretation of the exchange rate, inflation and interest rate criteria. As regards the first, 
it is completely in the discretion of the ECB and European Commission to state in an 
unambiguous fashion what are the requirements for a positive evaluation. If the European 
partners were to confirm the importance of the lower -2.25% margin within ERM II, the ceilings 
for VSTF as a mean of financing intramarginal interventions should be set at a relatively high 
level. As regards the latter two criteria, the problem seems more difficult, since they have been 
relatively unambiguously described in the Treaty and we do not see much room for pushing 
through a more reasonable interpretation. 
 
The second group of problems relates to the necessity of a simultaneous fulfilment of the 
exchange rate, inflation and general government deficit criteria. To achieve this goal, 
policymakers will have to optimally design interest rate, exchange rate and fiscal policies. In our 
view, there is a big role for fiscal policy. Since the fiscal tightening seems inevitable (otherwise 
Poland will not fulfil the deficit criterion) it can be designed in a way that would support both the 
fulfilment of the exchange rate and inflation criterion. If fiscal austerity is applied at the right 
point of time, i.e. shortly before ERM II accession, it will not only increase the credibility of 
exchange rate policy, but also give strong support to interest rate policy in the process of final 
disinflation at a point where the effectiveness of monetary policy is likely to be constrained. 
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